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Abstract: In parliamentary committee oversight hearings on fiscal policy, monetary policy and 
financial stability, where verbal deliberation is the focus, nonverbal communication may be pivotal in 
the acceptance or rejection of arguments proffered by policymakers. Systematic qualitative coding of 
these hearings in the 2010-15 UK Parliament finds that: (1) facial expressions, particularly in the 
form of anger and contempt, are more prevalent in fiscal policy hearings, where backbench 
parliamentarians hold frontbench parliamentarians to account, than in monetary policy or financial 
stability hearings, where the witnesses being held to account are unelected policy experts; (2) 
comparing committees across chambers, hearings in the Lords’ committee yield more reassuring 
facial expressions relative to hearings in the Commons’ committee, suggesting a more relaxed and 
less adversarial context in the former; and (3) central bank witnesses appearing before both the 
Commons’ and Lords’ committee tend towards expressions of appeasement, suggesting a willingness 
to defer to Parliament. 
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“To me, public accountability is a moral corollary of central bank independence. In a democratic 
society, the central bank’s freedom to act implies an obligation to explain itself to the public. … While 
central banks are not in the public relations business, public education ought to be part of their 
brief.” (Alan Blinder, Princeton University professor and former vice chairman, Federal Reserve 
Board [1] ) 
“We made clear as a committee that we were going to look at the distributional impact of the budget 
in unprecedented detail. As a result, George Osborne responded by giving a lot more detail not only 
in the budget but also when he came before us. And there were some pretty vigorous and detailed 
exchanges about the distributional impact of the budget in that hearing. I think everybody gained 
from that experience. It certainly enabled a wider public to find out exactly what was going on in the 
budget and the Government was forced to explain its actions.” (Andrew Tyrie MP, Chairman 
Treasury Select Committee, commenting on Chancellor Osborne’s first budget [2]) 
 
Public officials in modern democracies are conscious that their decisions and actions should 
be and are subject to scrutiny in the public domain. In the United Kingdom, this scrutiny is a statutory 
requirement and is conducted in formal parliamentary committee hearings. In economic policy, two 
very different sets of actors are routinely scrutinized by select committees: (1) officials of the Bank of 
England—who are not elected but appointed—are held accountable by committees in Parliament for 
their decisions in pursuit of their objectives towards monetary policy and financial stability; and (2) 
elected ministers from the UK Treasury are similarly held accountable for their objectives towards 
fiscal policy by these same parliamentary committees. The two quotes above—the first relating to 
monetary policy oversight and the second relating to fiscal policy oversight—highlight what might be 
considered the key priority for public accountability, namely the obligation to provide explanations 
for objectives held and decisions taken. In short, legislative hearings entail parliamentarians probing 
both central bankers and Treasury ministers; reasoned argument is therefore central to the purpose and 
focus of the hearings—that is, they are intended as a deliberative forum. 
To be clear, “accountability” refers here to the requirement that policymakers are held to 
account for their decisions; they are obliged to explain and justify their decisions, ex post facto. This 
use of accountability presupposes a reciprocal dialogue and crucially, necessitates a judgement on the 
effectiveness and persuasiveness of the policymaker who is being held to account. [3: 951] Thus, the 
policymakers face questions and the parliamentary committees render judgments. 
Notably, the concern here is with the explanations and justifications aspect of accountability, 
and as such, the focus is on the deliberative component of accountability, rather than the implications 
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or consequences of any judgements (e.g., sanctions, penalties or other consequences of judgements 
are not explored in this project). Moreover, the “judgments” of parliamentary committees are not in 
the form of votes (at least in respect to oversight hearings), but rather are on-going and cumulative 
assessments of ministers and experts. In this way, both the deliberations and the judgments are 
dynamic and inherently interactional. 
Although deliberation is at the heart of decision making within public policy, its contribution 
remains inherently hard to measure and assess within a systematic framework. One approach to 
studying deliberation empirically is to apply textual analysis to the verbatim transcripts from 
committee meetings. In studying American monetary policy decision making, this methodology has 
proven valuable for gaining insights into both the policy meetings of the Federal Open Market 
Committee and the conduct of oversight by congressional committees. [4] In a similar fashion for the 
UK, transcripts of both the Treasury Select Committee and Lords Economic Affairs Committee 
hearings on monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy [5] were analysed over the period 
from 2010 to 2015 (i.e., the previous Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government). The 2010-15 
Parliament is especially important for select committee activity, given the much greater prominence 
of these committees following the key reforms of 2010 which among other things, created the election 
of committee members and chairs, thereby stripping the power of the party whips to appoint these 
members and thereby lent the committees greater autonomy in holding the Government to account 
[6], and even (more rarely) triggering resignations by top officials (most recently, the resignation of a 
newly appointed Bank of England deputy governor [7]). 
The findings from textual analysis are instructive as to the depth and breadth of arguments 
used by policymakers in their defence of policy actions. In particular, this analysis finds that 
deliberation in fiscal policy hearings contrasts sharply with deliberation in monetary policy and 
financial stability hearings, and moreover, the deliberation conducted by MPs in the Commons 
committee also contrasts systematically from that conducted by peers in the Lords committee. The 
context for these differences in content will be described further below, but the point here is that while 
textual analysis is effective in empirically measuring the deliberative content, it provides no 
information as to the delivery of these arguments within a deliberative setting.  In short, the written 
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record provides us with the semantic content of deliberation, but not the underlying interpersonal 
dynamic of the committee hearing. Measuring nonverbal behaviour promises a means to gauge better 
both the emotive tone of the arguments but also the nature of the intentions of the witnesses appearing 
before each committee, witnesses whose credibility and intentions with respect to public policy are 
being judged by parliamentarians. It is this interactional dynamic that this paper seeks to assess. 
To be sure, the study of nonverbal communication in political contexts is extensive. For 
example, televised debates of national leaders are frequently used to examine the effects of nonverbal 
communication on political attitudes and responses. [8-10] While the effects of visual cues by 
political leaders are noted in political election campaigns,[11] [12-14] to date there has however been 
little attention paid to the role of nonverbal communication in legislative committee hearings. 
Methodologically, the goal here is to bring research from interpersonal communication 
studies, political psychology and political ethology (behaviour) into the study of committee 
deliberation, and to show that nonverbal communication can play a potentially important role in 
government accountability. Indeed, there are strong biological and cognitive reasons why information 
gleaned from nonverbal means should be evaluated on par with that from verbal communication. To 
name but a few, the human brain is both more specialized and faster in processing visual information 
than it is in processing written/verbal information, and cognition is easier for the former than for the 
latter. [15] Verbal language is also a relatively recent phenomenon in human history (in written form, 
“just 5,200 years”) relative to the millions of years’ history of visual perception. In short, the 
evolutionary development of the brain suggests that its adaptive ability to absorb visual information is 
far more advanced (in evolutionary terms) than for written and spoken communication. [15: 12] 
Elsewhere, communication scholars have long argued that verbal and nonverbal behaviour work 
together in the process of communication.[11: 11, 20] Empirical investigations into the quality of 
deliberation in public policy accountability which focus solely on verbal exchanges thus risk missing 
the role of nonverbal behaviour in shaping such fundamental features as the credibility and 
trustworthiness of witnesses being held to account for their policy decisions, and more broadly, these 
investigations risk studying just a portion of the actual messages that are being conveyed. 
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Moreover, nonverbal messages may influence—either consciously or not—the attitudes and 
behaviours of select committee members, particularly in the form of persuasion. As Bucy notes, 
nonverbal behaviour “may prime later judgments about political viability and shape the criteria by 
which [in this paper, witnesses] are evaluated.” [16] In legislative committee settings, where verbal 
deliberation is the focus, nonverbal communication may be pivotal in the acceptance or rejection of 
arguments proffered by policymakers. This study offers an initial assessment of the role of nonverbal 
cues in parliamentary committee oversight hearings on economic policy. Viewed from the traditional 
Lowi policy typology, [17, 18] where political relationships and conflicts are shaped by people’s 
expectations of policy outputs, one might expect to find more ideological/partisan conflicts in fiscal 
policy hearings than in either monetary policy or financial stability hearings, as the former aligns with 
clear partisan cleavages whereas the latter two policies are less overtly partisan in orientation.  
Moreover, a pertinent feature of the UK parliamentary system is that in fiscal policy hearings, 
backbench parliamentarians (the legislature) hold front bench parliamentarians (the executive) to 
account, which invariably generates more partisan tension than in hearings between parliamentarians 
and unelected (and ostensibly non-partisan) experts such as central bankers. Hence, while one might 
expect the argumentative content of fiscal policy discussions to be more ideological and partisan than 
for monetary policy or financial stability, neither Lowi nor his followers explored how perceptions 
and judgments of this content might be influenced by the delivery of this content, and so this aspect of 
the policy divide is as yet unexplored. 
The Significance of Nonverbal Communication in Parliamentary Hearings 
Broadly speaking, persuasion may be the product of (1) the content of the argument (e.g., its 
logic, its evidence, whether it difficult or easy to understand [19]); (2) the way in which it is 
structured or framed; [20, 21] or possibly (3) the way in which it is delivered. It is in the delivery of 
an argument that nonverbal cues become potentially relevant. While persuasion is not measured 
directly in this paper, we do examine the nonverbal context (e.g., combative versus relaxed) in light of 
the potential for persuasion to occur—i.e., it is worth considering the extent to which nonverbal 
behaviour may facilitate the persuasiveness of an argument or a committee witness more generally, as 
well as how this behaviour may affect the deliberative process. 
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Within the broader literature on deliberation, the emotive aspects of nonverbal 
communication are typically ignored in favour of the more rational, more deliberative aspects of 
communication. And yet, as Kahneman famously notes, psychologists have long noted two modes of 
thinking, one that is instinctual and “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no 
sense of voluntary control,” and one that is methodical and deliberative, thereby taking time, mental 
effort and concentration. [22: 20-21] By focusing on nonverbal communication, we are allowing for 
the influence of “fast” thinking and behaviour on our “slow” decision-making processes—particularly 
in the form of persuasion. For instance, as a component of nonverbal communication, rapid 
appearance-based assessments of candidates (linked to competence and dominance) are shown to be a 
strong predictor of electoral success. [23] Indeed, if we interpret nonverbal communication as a form 
of “fast” thinking and behaviour, the visual stimuli inherent in this form of communication may well 
outweigh the slower, rational and verbal forms of communication. In reviewing both the evolutionary 
and biological bases of the visual processing of information, Grabe and Bucy note that “(c)ontrary to 
the preferences of political theorists for a rationally engaged public that relies on reason and 
deliberation to make informed decisions, visual experience remains the most dominant mode of 
learning.” [15: 12-13]  
Beyond affecting the persuasiveness of speakers and their arguments, there are other reasons 
to anticipate nonverbal communication to be a fruitful avenue of research. One reason is that whereas 
speech is deliberate and sometimes scripted, nonverbal communication is far less conscious: “People 
are formally trained in their verbal behaviour in the schools. Nonverbal communication is less 
obvious, as in subtle facial expressions and barely perceptible changes in voice tone, and people are 
not typically formally trained in their nonverbal communication.” [24: 8] Admittedly, politicians and 
officials often undergo some media training before giving evidence in parliamentary hearings (as well 
as for other official engagements) and most are practiced public communicators. Hence, we might 
expect their nonverbal communication (as well as their verbal communication) to be more controlled. 
It is nonetheless unlikely that such training entirely negates the tendencies of these individuals to 
allow their own innate mannerisms and emotions to find expression. Consequently, even subtle facial 
expressions, gestures and other signals such as voice may provide important insights into not only the 
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intentions of committee members, but also the competence, trustworthiness and credibility of the 
witnesses who are being held to account.  
Interpreting Nonverbal Communication 
Emotions versus signals 
The extent to which nonverbal behaviour “signals” the strategic intentions of the sender is, 
however, disputed, particularly in the literature on facial expressions. On the one hand, such 
behaviour might serve as a visual manifestation of an individual’s emotions—i.e., a spill-over or 
leakage of some discernible internal emotion(s). [25] Core emotions are said to be “associated with 
unique physiological signatures in both the central and autonomic nervous systems,” and are, 
moreover, “expressed universally in all humans via facial expressions regardless of race, culture, sex, 
ethnicity, or national origin.” [26: 25] Seven emotions—anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise and 
contempt—are each said to produce unique and identifiable facial expressions. [27] This causal link 
between the face and internal emotions has been, however, challenged on a number of fronts 
including the categorization of complex emotions into single facial expressions and the tendency to 
overlook context.  
In contrast to the emotions view of faces, a second interpretation is that facial expressions are 
employed as social devices to manage interpersonal and intragroup encounters. This approach stems 
in part from animal communication, where animals “signal” a behavioural intent—such as to attack or 
to appease—as a means to negotiate conflict and cooperation with other animals. [28] [29] This 
behavioural ecology approach maintains that both intention and context are essential to the 
interpretation of facial expressions. [30] For example, an angry face conveys a readiness to attack 
while a contempt face is a way to express superiority. [30] And yet, some facial expressions like 
smiling may in fact convey a combination of emotions—e.g., a genuine (“felt”) smile may signify a 
willingness to befriend or to play, but a feigned (“false”) smile may signify readiness to acquiesce or 
appease, or this phony smile may mask some underlying negative emotion (such as anger). [14] 
Contempt can also be conveyed in a “controlled half smile” by which an individual signals tolerance 
but not acceptance of some other group member. [14]  
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The social and political significance of facial expressions may thus be categorized as intent to 
attack or threaten (anger face), reassurance or willingness to socially bond (happiness), appeasement 
(sadness), or intention to flee/submit (fear), and each of these have been identified in the facial 
expressions of televised politicians. [31] [13] [14] The socio-political significance of this typology 
becomes clear when it is subsumed into two broader typologies of social interaction or behavioural 
types—agonic and hedonic. [32] In agonic interactions the actors are in direct competition for power 
and so in an effort to maintain social order, one might submit to or appease the threatening actor. In 
hedonic encounters, actors are more relaxed (even playful), in pursuit of social bonding and alliance 
building or to reassure/reinforce social status. Facial expressions (and other nonverbal behaviour, like 
posture [33]) are thus indicative of dominance hierarchy [11] [13] and can serve to signal either 
cooperative or non-cooperative intent. For instance, in a one-shot anonymous prisoner’s dilemma 
game, contempt expressions have been found to predict defection by the sender, while genuine smiles 
signify cooperative intention. [34]  An important caveat to the behavioural ecology approach is that 
nonverbal messages conveyed by a communicator do not elicit identical emotional responses in all 
receivers, as the effect of the nonverbal signal is shaped by prior attitudes and the context in which the 
behaviour occurs. [13] Moreover, some people are simply better at “decoding” the signals of 
nonverbal behaviour, as studies of gestures has shown. [35] 
The emotions and behavioural ecology interpretations are sometimes depicted as if they are in 
conflict, with disagreement on facial expressions including “their clarity, specificity, extent of their 
innateness and universality, and whether they relate to emotions, social motives, behavioural 
intentions, or to all three.” [25] Nonetheless both rely on the evolutionary literature (e.g., Darwin 
[36]) and in the end converge on the assessment that facial expressions function to communicate 
information. [25] 
Facial Expressions, Vocal Cues and Gestures in Parliamentary Oversight 
Once investigation turns to the empirics of nonverbal communication, the analytical and 
methodological framework encounters significant hurdles, not least of which is the appropriateness of 
the data to be examined. One might, for example, begin quite broadly by measuring the static visuals 
of the setting, such as the committee room, seating arrangement, lighting, temperature and so on, as 
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some communications scholars have done. [11] For simplicity, here the focus is on three primary 
forms of dynamic nonverbal communication: facial expressions, vocal cues, and body 
movement/gestures. These key aspects of communication are shown to be highly effective in gauging 
behaviour by political actors whose appeals to voters are being televised,[15] although the largest 
attention in the literature has been given to facial expressions. 
The political significance of facial expressions is aptly summarized by Stewart and 
colleagues: “The face has long been appreciated as a focal point of attention by those competing for 
positions of power and then for maintaining influence once power has been attained. In large part, this 
is caused by the ability leaders have in communicating their emotional state and behavioural intent 
nonverbally to followers …[italics added].”  [14] The previous section has focused predominantly on 
facial expressions for the simple reason that competition for power (and jockeying for political 
position) is at least a subtext of parliamentary committees that seek to hold Government to account. 
While there is no overt competition concerning policy per se, oversight itself contains an element of 
competition over the influence and direction of policy decisions. In the case of unelected central 
bankers, there is a recognition that independence of the central bank is not absolute—typically 
governments set the goals while central banks retain discretion over how to pursue these objectives 
(i.e., independence to choose the appropriate instrument(s)). [1] Moreover, it is by parliamentary 
statute that the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee and Financial Policy Committee exist 
and in theory, Parliament could abolish these independent committees.  
Thus, when central bank experts appear before parliamentary committees, they are invariably 
cognisant of their politically dependent existence. In contrast, the situation is more overtly 
competitive in fiscal policy hearings. The primary witness in these proceedings is the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, who—like members of the Treasury Committee—is himself a Member of Parliament. 
There is no statutory independence given to either the Treasury or to the Chancellor himself. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, fiscal policy is inherently more partisan in nature than monetary policy, 
thus further exacerbating the competitive nature of these hearings. Broadly speaking, then, we might 
expect fiscal policy hearings to feature more competitive (agonic) nonverbal facials expressions, and 
monetary policy and financial stability hearings to showcase expressions of a more reassuring 
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(hedonic) nature. Employing a behavioural model of leader-follower interactions, [37] we might 
expect dominant individuals (leading committee members) to invoke threatening facial expressions 
(e.g., anger) and the presumed subordinate (the Chancellor) to display more submissive or appeasing 
emotional expressions like sadness or fear. (Select committees may presume that witnesses from the 
Government—e.g., the Chancellor—are in a subordinate role when being held to account before the 
committee; however, as part of the executive, the Chancellor himself may dispute his subordinate role 
before the committee.) 
A non-competitive setting would predict different facial expressions: dominant individuals 
(committee members) should seek “to enhance group affiliation by reassuring subordinates [here, 
witnesses from the Bank of England] through facial displays of happiness, while subordinates … will 
display submissiveness through appeasement gestures such as sadness.” [37] The presumed 
motivation in both settings and by both sets of actors is to regulate relations within the group (here, 
committee members and witnesses) and for each set of actors to maintain their status within the group 
setting; [32] nonverbal behaviour thus functions to regulate intragroup relations.  
Turning to vocal cues, research (and consensus) on the emotional significance or 
interpretation of vocal expressions is less developed than for facial expressions. [38: 63] Indeed 
scientific research into the voice is said to be in “its infancy.” [39] Nonetheless identifiable 
characteristics of nonverbal vocal cues include pitch, loudness, the quality or “timbre” of the 
speaker’s voice, rate of speech, amount of time spent speaking, response time (how long it takes 
person A to respond to person B), time spent pausing between words, and  errors in speech. [38: 58-
59] Such characteristics are relevant for parliamentary committee deliberations inasmuch as listeners 
remember better (and are more persuaded by) information if the pitch and amplitude are varied, and 
persuasion is further increased when the speaker pauses less frequently, spends less time in his or her 
responses, and speaks more quickly. [38: 67] An alternative focus of research is on the vocal cues of 
audiences, including laughter and booing of presidential debates audiences, [40] [41] or the link 
between the interruptions by Supreme Court justices during oral argument and their judicial voting 
behaviour. [42] Others have examined Supreme Court oral argument even more closely, with 
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attention given to such features as speech rate, speech disturbances, the valence of expression and 
related factors, [43] and to vocal cues between a Justice and a lawyer. [44]   
 Beyond facial expressions and voice, gestures and body movement comprise a third 
influential mode of nonverbal communication. Among other functions, gestures help to illustrate 
speech (e.g., pointing and saying “there”; nodding and saying “yes”) or serve as “emblems” in place 
of words (e.g., thumbs up for “okay,” shoulder shrugging for “I don’t know/care”). [45: 76-79] In 
contrast to the biological underpinnings for facial expressions and vocal cues, however, emblematic 
gestures are culturally learned and are therefore less clear-cut to study and interpret. Illustrators may 
serve a more universal purpose by communicating greater intensity: as Bull notes, “a speaker can pick 
out particular words or phrases which may be important in his communication, and highlight them 
with some kind of illustrative body movement.” [33] Illustrators may also serve as a visual means for 
viewers to track the flow of speech and, with this greater stimulation, better comprehend speech. [46] 
Alternatively, illustrators might actually convey more about the speaker’s emotions regarding 
message content or attitudes towards one’s audience. [33] Studies have also found systematic effects 
on voters’ evaluations from differences in the use of gestures by female and male politicians, [47] 
although in the present study, women do not feature prominently either as witnesses (where the two 
Governors and the Chancellor are male) or as committee chairs (again, both are male).  
For the purposes of this paper where the focus is on nonverbal communication in a 
deliberative (verbal) context, two difficulties in measuring and coding gestures are relevant. First, 
viewers are not equally adept at capturing the informative content of gestures: “research has … 
demonstrated that some people seem to miss out on … information in the gesture channel almost 
completely; others are tuned in to it and quite unconsciously process this important information along 
with the speech itself.[35] Second, viewers of gestures are highly selective about which gestures are 
actually “seen,” in part because our natural focus is on the face, where attention gravitates. [35: 150]  
In any case, the study of gestures in politics is increasingly capturing the attention of researchers 
across many disciplines, including political science, history, philosophy and psycholinguistics. [40, 
48-50]  
Measuring Nonverbal Communication in Parliamentary Committee Hearings 
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As noted, the purpose of the present research is unique in that it seeks to capture the 
interactional dynamic of the deliberation between a series of questioners (parliamentarians) and a 
series of witnesses, particularly as collective groups. Unlike many empirical investigations of 
nonverbal behaviour discussed earlier, the subjects of investigation are engaged in a reciprocal form 
of communication: rather than giving speeches, they are asking and answering questions—they are 
not directing their words and actions at some passive audience but rather engaging with and reacting 
to one another. This means that the empirical focus is the exchange between two actors (a committee 
member and a witness), repeated with new sets of actors (or a new committee member and the same 
witness), for the duration of each committee hearing.as co 
A casual observer might easily dismiss nonverbal behaviour in parliamentary hearings, 
concluding that what really matters is the verbal arguments and discussion. Even anecdotal evidence 
illustrates that this is not necessarily the case. In March 2014, one hearing raised the spectre of a 
possible major transformation in the conduct of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee 
meetings, through a substantial increase in the transparency of policy making discussions. During this 
hearing, Treasury Select Committee Chairman Andrew Tyre queried Paul Fisher (Executive Director 
for Markets and member of the MPC) and Mark Carney (Governor, Bank of England) on whether the 
Bank stored the verbatim transcripts of the MPC meetings, once these were summarized and 
published as minutes. The exchange became fodder for MPs and other Bank observers who have 
sought greater transparency from the Bank. As seen in the media attention given to this hearing 
(Figure 1), nonverbal communication plays a distinct role in capturing the underlying conflict 
between Parliament and the Bank of England (see highlighted text). 
[Figure 1 – about here] 
Examples of media and press attention to nonverbal behaviour in select committee hearings are not 
difficult to find, but as yet no attempt has been made to examine this behaviour more systematically. 
 Coding of Nonverbal Behaviour in Parliamentary Hearings 
A pilot study for coding nonverbal behaviour was completed using five full hearings (each 
with a duration around two hours), from which a simplified coding structure was devised and 
implemented. Three research assistants (one with his doctorate and with over 15 years of research 
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experience, and two second-year undergraduates) then independently revised a scheme to 
systematically code specific nonverbal expressions and behaviour of key individuals for 12 hearings 
(comprising 23 total hours of video footage, all of which is publicly available from the UK Parliament 
website-- http://www.parliament.uk/). These hearings are a representative sample of the 37 total 
hearings on monetary policy, financial stability and fiscal policy in the Commons’ Treasury Select 
Committee (hereafter, the Commons committee) and the Lords’ Economic Affairs Committee 
(hereafter, the Lords committee), over the 2010-15 Parliament (see Appendix 1), which was the first 
parliamentary session to implement significant reforms which elevated them to greater prominence 
(e.g., the election of committee chairs), also lending them more autonomy in holding the Government 
to account. 
While the total 37 hearings have been analysed in their entirety, using automated textual 
analysis and are reported in [5], the 12 coded hearings were selected in reasonably evenly distributed 
intervals across the 2010-15 timeframe, while factoring into account the (a) inherent imbalance in the 
distribution of hearings across types of witnesses (27 total hearings for Bank of England officials on 
monetary policy and financial stability versus ten total hearings for the Chancellor on fiscal policy) 
and across chambers (30 total hearings in the Commons’ committee and seven in the Lords’ 
committee), and (b) that the Lords’ committee held no hearings specifically on financial stability 
during the 2010-15 Parliament. Thus, for Bank of England witnesses, eight hearings were selected 
(six for monetary policy and two for financial stability), and for the Chancellor, four hearings. Across 
chambers, ten were from the Commons and two were from the Lords. 
Before beginning coding, the RAs underwent four on-line training courses on micro 
expressions and subtle expressions (all obtained from the Paul Ekman Group) and in each of the on-
line tests, were required to achieve a success rate of at least 75%. The training focused particularly on 
identifying the seven basic emotions (joy/happiness, surprise, anger, contempt, sadness, fear, disgust), 
which are identifiable in facial expressions. The test stimuli were provided in the training packages. 
The RAs were also given a practical  textbook [51] on “body language” to review and use as a 
reference for the gesture coding. 
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The coding proceeded as follows. For each hearing, each MP or peer’s “turn” in asking 
questions was treated as a “deliberative exchange”. For the most part, this consisted of a back and 
forth between one MP or peer and one witness, although it could include one or more witnesses. A 
single deliberative exchange may consist of between 5 to 10 minutes of questions and answers 
between a committee member and a witness. The term “deliberative exchange” is unique to this 
project and is used to distinguish it from the “turn-taking” concept, which is commonly understood to 
consist of an individual speaker taking a turn in a conversation, in a back and forth series of turns for 
an entire conversation. [52: 86] For each exchange, three basic dimensions were coded: facial 
expressions, vocal cues and gestures/posture.  The coding scheme is summarized in Appendix 2. 
Facial expressions such as anger, contempt and happiness were counted as single instances (counts) 
and then tallied for each of the participants in the deliberative exchange. Similarly, vocal cues, such as 
variations in volume, speed, and pauses in speaking were also tallied by individual and across each 
deliberative exchange, as were gestures such as leaning forward, nodding or shaking the head. The 
bulk of the coding which is reported below is based on broad areas of agreement among the three 
coders. The threshold for agreement rests not on the numeric scores (counts) themselves but rather on 
the relative weights of the different types of witnesses (elected minister for fiscal policy versus 
unelected experts for monetary policy and financial stability) and of the two parliamentary 
committees (Commons versus Lords). As such, the coding is used largely as a qualitative assessment, 
and as a precursor to a larger, multi-method investigation which gauges more fully the impact of 
nonverbal communication in parliamentary oversight hearings. 
Some attention is also given to where the coders disagreed. To be sure, measures for coding 
should avoid incurring inconsistencies arising from human idiosyncrasies, [53] and to the extent that 
the agreed results reported below are based upon a simple 100% agreement that one set of witnesses 
or committee exhibited relatively more nonverbal cues (anger, happiness, etc) than the other set of 
witnesses or committee, the bulk of the coding results do not report as findings any inconsistencies 
among the coders (and so, a measure such as Krippendorff’s Alpha is not used). Studies do not 
usually discuss differences among coders (although exceptions include: Schubert and colleagues, who 
comment on a coder’s “idiosyncratic tendency to overcode”; [43] and Bucy and Gong, who discuss 
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specific techniques for improving intercoder reliability and precision [9, 55-58]) and yet—as 
discussed earlier—receivers of nonverbal messages do not necessarily respond in similar ways, as 
these signals are conditional on pre-existing attitudes and the situational context of the behaviour, and 
some individuals are simply more adept than others in discerning the meaning of the signals. Finally, 
“stereotypical” university undergraduates have been criticized for being “socially compliant” and 
“more likely to be mercurial in their attitudes because of lack of self-knowledge.” [54] While this 
complaint is made in reference to undergraduates as research participants, the authors nonetheless 
argue that different cultural groups (and by inference, different age groups) vary in their perceptions 
of nonverbal communication. [54] It is worth, then, allowing here for the possibility that—in spite of 
having received the same training in coding nonverbal behaviour—a meaningful difference may still 
emerge between younger coders (aged 20-22) and another older coder (in his 40s). 
Underlying the coding exercise was a premise that nonverbal behaviour helps to capture the 
extent of interest in the topic or the intensity of the discussion. (This is akin to motivational activation. 
[55, 56]) Witnesses who are more nonverbally expressive in hearings may be making greater effort to 
persuade the committee members (as studies of the use of gestures have shown [52]), or certain facial 
expressions may be expressing latent emotions. 
Informed researchers in nonverbal communication may (quite rightly) note that software is 
beginning to be available for automatically coding facial expressions (e.g., Visage, FaceReader), and 
plausibly such software could be used in this instance, rather than human coders. There are three 
rebuttals to this argument. First, humans still outperform computers in interpreting the nuances and 
context of facial expressions, although the capacity of automation is no doubt rapidly evolving. [57] 
Second, no software as yet (of which I am aware) automatically codes facial expressions, vocal cues 
and gestures as a whole package. Third, software that codes all relevant aspects of nonverbal 
communication may well be around the corner; nonetheless, this does not negate the importance of 
obtaining human coding of the various categories, as observed in real world settings. Human coding 
may serve to first map the contours of nonverbal expression in parliamentary hearings, and 
subsequent automation may then rely on such human coding as a baseline. In short, human coders 
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may initially define the contours of nonverbal cues in parliamentary hearings, and software may 
subsequently refine or even challenge these outright. 
A further response, which extends beyond this paper, is that the coding of the hearings is the 
first half of a research design which then supplements this with an experiment. In the experiment 
some participants watched selected footage from the twelve parliamentary hearings previously coded 
in their entirety by the three RAs, while a second group served as a control group, in that they only 
listened to recordings of these same hearings. Following completion of the nine videos and questions 
on these videos, participants met in groups to discuss their individual impressions of the witnesses, 
according to their likeability, competence and persuasiveness. Following these discussions, 
participants returned to their stations, and were asked whether the group discussion changed their 
initial impressions of each witness and if so, why or why not. This post-group element sought to 
gauge the extent to which participants were influenced by others to change their views, given 
knowledge of the views of fellow participants. This experiment—together with a qualitative analysis 
of about two dozen elite interviews with members of both select committees, and former witnesses 
from the Bank of England and Treasury—is added to the human coding of facial expressions, vocal 
cues and gestures.  
 Findings: Nonverbal Communication in Parliamentary Committees  
The Context 
Again, the focus here is on the delivery, rather than the content, of the discourse in the 
parliamentary hearings. Nonetheless, to understand the delivery some context is required. From an 
earlier analysis of the full verbatim transcripts of the 37 oversight hearings on monetary policy, 
financial stability and fiscal policy during the 2010-15 Parliament, variation in deliberation was found 
(1) between types of witnesses and types of economic policies; (2) between MPs and peers in their 
respective committees; and, (3) in partisan influence across different policy areas.   
First, it was found that oversight varies between (a) members of the Bank of England’s 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and Financial Policy Committee (FPC) on monetary policy and 
financial stability, and (b) Treasury ministers and officials--primarily Chancellor George Osborne--on 
fiscal policy. The key difference is that hearings with Bank officials tend to exhibit greater reciprocity 
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in deliberation, whereas those on fiscal policy exhibit more of a “talking across” one another 
phenomenon. In monetary policy, both MPs and peers tend to enter into exchanges with MPC 
members on each theme discussed. In these hearings, many members on both sides of the table are 
able and willing to engage in discussion on multiple themes, rather than focusing on just one. In fiscal 
policy, the chancellor tends to speak to one theme, whereas committee members focus on other 
themes, and individually, these committee members tend not to focus on more than one theme. 
Deliberation in financial stability hearings exhibits more of a committee-level reciprocity—that is, 
FPC members and MPs speak to the same set of themes, but there is more topic specialization among 
the witnesses than in monetary policy.  
Second, deliberative reciprocity is evident for both sets of committee hearings on monetary 
policy; however, in the Commons’ committee, members tend to speak to multiple themes, whereas in 
the Lords’ committee peers tend to focus on one theme. A key criterion for judging the quality of 
economic policy oversight is its degree of reciprocity. As Pedrini and colleagues explain, reciprocity 
in deliberation entails “both interactivity and respect. It involves an effort to listen to and engage with 
people with whom we disagree ….” [58]. Reciprocity therefore requires participants to “engage with 
one another” so that “they do not only give reasons but listen and take up the reasons of other 
participants” (italics added). [58] 
Third, in the Commons, partisanship appears to vary across policy areas. In monetary policy 
hearings there is virtually no cleavage between the two main parties, whereas in fiscal policy, MPs of 
the minority party (Labour) tend to be more extensive in their questioning of the Conservative 
chancellor. For financial stability, a small amount of partisanship could be discerned in the greater 
tendency of Labour members to speak to the housing issue. (UK housing policy has become more 
ideologically contentious as escalating house prices in recent decades have made home ownership 
increasingly unaffordable. Hence, the provision of “social housing” for disadvantaged groups has 
evolved into discussions of appropriate welfare spending by government. [59]) 
Results  
[Table 1, about here] 
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Table 1 provides the summary findings for the nonverbal coding. In Appendix 3, Tables A1 
through A4 provide the details for the codings. Table 1 reports only where all three coders agreed on 
the relative weights across the witness type or the committee type. (In cases of a tie in the scores 
across groups, the determination of coder agreement relied on agreement of rankings by the other two 
coders.) These summaries correspond to Tables A1 to A4, where the findings highlighted in each 
table (in bold or underline) represent only where the coders agreed, and in italicized brackets, the 
degree to which one witness or group type was greater than another.    
Table 1 begins with the aggregate means (corresponding to Tables A1 and A2), as grouped by 
witness type (Bank of England or Her Majesty’s Treasury [HMT]); and by legislative chamber 
(Lords, Commons). The scores are presented for both the parliamentary committee members and the 
witness, and they aggregate across all the three types of nonverbal communication analysed here 
(facial, vocal and gesture). At the most aggregate level, fiscal policy hearings—in which the 
chancellor is the one key witness (with only marginal interjections from Treasury officials)—exhibit 
more nonverbal behaviour than hearings with Bank of England officials. For the facial expressions, 
the committee members in both chambers (MPs and Lords) and the witnesses have more coded facial 
expressions in fiscal policy hearings than Bank of England hearings. The same is true for witnesses 
when it comes to gesture scores as well. Finally, across chambers, peers score higher on vocal scores 
than do MPs.  
What does this mean? For one, in fiscal policy—where ideological/partisan conflicts are more 
in evidence as redistributive effects are discussed—we find in the aggregate, more intense nonverbal 
behaviour than in monetary policy or financial stability. Bridging these findings with the textual 
analysis of the transcripts, we note that in fiscal policy hearings, not only do committee members and 
witnesses tend to “talk across” one another, they also become quite animated in doing so—perhaps in 
frustration with the failure to engage in a more reciprocal dialogue. In both monetary policy and 
financial stability, where testimony centres more on technical language, the deliberative exchange is 
far less animated and emotionally engaging between questioner and witness. Simply put, Chancellor 
Osborne’s testimony is more partisan in orientation while that of the Bank’s experts is more technical 
and, by implication, partisan language conveys more emotive cues than technical language. During 
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fiscal policy hearings the parliamentarians in both the Commons and Lords tend to reciprocate in kind 
with their own more frequent use of facial expressions. Moreover, Osborne also tends to use hand 
movement more frequently than Bank experts, which may suggest that he sought to persuade his 
fellow parliamentarians to a greater extent than did officials from the central bank. (Notably, while all 
the coders observed Osborne’s frequent hand movement, one coder scored these movements 
considerably higher, which supports Beattie’s earlier observation that some people are simply more 
attuned to “seeing” gestures than others.) 
Across chambers, peers in the Lords’ committee tend to use more vocal cues than MPs in the 
Commons’ committee. Notably, Lords tend to be economic experts in their own right (e.g., former 
chancellors, such as Nigel Lawson, or financiers, such as Michael Forsyth) and the questioning tends 
to be more discursive --that is, peers tend to spend more time in phrasing and elaborating upon their 
questions before allowing witnesses to respond. This finding aligns with anecdotal observations and 
elite interviews with committee members that greater discursiveness from peers is likely to produce 
more vocal cues. 
Section II of Table 1 (corresponding with Table A3) summarizes the mean scores for selected 
facial expressions, focusing on anger, disgust, contempt, happiness and sadness. A key emotion 
expressed in these facial expressions by both parliamentary committee members and Treasury 
witnesses (predominantly Chancellor Osborne) is anger. This emotion is, by comparison, exhibited 
far less frequently in hearings with Bank experts. Importantly, anger is expressed by both the 
committees and the witnesses in fiscal policy hearings. One further emotion—contempt—is also more 
prominently expressed by witnesses in fiscal policy hearings than in Bank of England hearings. 
Moreover, focusing on the fiscal policy hearings, we also observe that the witnesses (again, 
predominantly the chancellor) exhibit greater contempt than do the parliamentarians who are engaged 
in questioning.  In short, fiscal policy hearings unleash higher levels of anger by questioners and 
witnesses alike, than Bank oversight hearings. In addition, witnesses tend to exhibit contempt towards 
committee members, but this does not appear to be returned by the committee members towards the 
witnesses.   
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Turning to reassuring or happy facial expressions, the comparison across chambers suggests 
that witnesses (both Bank and Treasury) appearing before the Lords committee tend to be more 
congenial than those appearing before the Commons. Conversely, for expressions of sadness, both 
committee members and witnesses are more rueful in the Commons’ committee than in the Lords’ 
committee. This does seem to suggest a difference in interactional dynamic between the two 
committees, with a more reassuring dynamic in the Lords’ hearings (by witnesses and committee 
members) and more concern or appeasement (“sadness”) in the Commons’ hearings. Observers of 
deliberative norms in both committees note that because partisanship is less acute in the House of 
Lords’ committees, these hearings tend to be relatively more relaxed than those in the Commons’ 
committees[60], which may help explain this finding. Evidence for this is both from my own 
interviews with MPs, peers and policy experts, as well as from other published accounts: “The 
absence of an absolute majority, the presence of a sizeable body of peers with no party affiliations and 
the appointed nature of the House (members not seeing one another as electoral threats) have resulted 
in a less adversarial approach and fewer divisions than in the Commons.” [60, 129] Arguably, MPs 
generally hold career aspirations and are not as established as are peers, and thus we might draw upon 
a behavioural model of nonverbal communication for an interpretation of this finding (e.g., the 
“challenger” style (aggressive) versus the “power holder” style (more confident, assured) [61]).  
From the behavioural model of leader-follower interactions discussed earlier, one is tempted 
to depict the Commons’ committee as a competitive setting and the Lords’ committee as non-
competitive. Some aspects of this model seem to apply—e.g., the anger by parliamentarians in the 
Commons’ committee and the sadness/appeasement of Bank officials in this same committee. But the 
goal of maintaining social order through fear/submission does not appear to hold for the chancellor in 
fiscal policy hearings; rather, he in essence mirrors the anger of the committee members and adds to 
this contempt. Bank officials also do not respond with fear to the anger of the committee members, 
although their nonverbal expressions of sadness/appeasement are less overtly combative than the 
chancellor’s contemptuous expressions. In short, the expectation of the behavioural model for 
nonverbal behaviour is that actors will adapt their behaviour in order to regulate social relations. The 
interesting finding here is that the chancellor does not appear to respond as expected in either a 
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competitive setting (fear) or a non-competitive setting (appeasement), whereas central bankers 
respond in both committees along the lines of what would be expected in a non-competitive setting. 
[Figure 2 – about here] 
There is, however, one final observation which appears out of place—i.e., the higher 
happiness/reassurance displays by Treasury witnesses, relative to Bank experts. At first, this does not 
accord with the parallel findings of more anger and contempt by Treasury witnesses in these hearings. 
An intuitive interpretation is the tendency of politicians to be somewhat disingenuous in “putting a 
positive spin” (literally, by smiling) on politically sensitive budgetary news. To explore this further, 
Figure 2 presents still photos of Chancellor Osborne which were taken from the coded hearings. The 
contrast is between the top row and the bottom row (but ignoring his notable weight loss [62]). The 
“smirk” in Osborne’s smile has been noted previously by journalists, [63] and this element can be 
seen in the smiles on the first row. The second row smiles are quite different in being more genuine. 
More specifically, the bottom row smiles resemble the enjoyment smile (also known as the 
“Duchenne” smile, named after Duchenne de Boulogne [64]), which accords with feelings of 
happiness or amusement, but may also be signalling cooperation. [14] In the top row, Osborne’s teeth 
are less in evidence, and the muscles surrounding the eyes are not contracted, as one would expect 
from an enjoyment smile. [16]  
[Figures 3 and 3a – about here] 
Figures 3 and 3a examine differences in the distributions of facial expression coding. The top 
and bottom distributions (“J” and “R”) are from the two undergraduate coders, while the distribution 
by “G” is from the older coder (with nearly twenty years of experience in empirical political science 
research). Both the undergraduates code the happy scores of the hearings with the chancellor (HMT) 
relatively higher than all other facial expressions (and coder “R” tended to overcode, as seen in the 
vertical scale; Figure 3a thus provides an enlarged version of these scores). In contrast, coder “G” 
produces a wider array of facial expression scores, which indicates more scores for anger, contempt 
and surprise, and less for happiness. While it is highly unconventional to note what appear to be 
idiosyncratic differences among coders, both the nature of Osborne’s phony smiles and the contrast 
between the innate experience of the coders suggest that the degree of contempt and anger by Osborne 
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agreed upon by all three coders (from Table 1) may in fact be greater, if perhaps the undergraduate 
coders had received more extensive training in the specific nature of Osborne’s false or phony smiles. 
At the very least, Figures 2, 3 and 3a suggest that much more could be done to more accurately 
capture the genuine and more controlled expressions of Chancellor Osborne. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The quotes at the beginning of this paper presage the findings of nonverbal behaviour in the 
committee hearings. Speaking from his experience as a central banker, Alan Blinder emphasizes that 
unelected (independent) central bankers are morally accountable to the public and are thereby obliged 
to explain themselves. In their appearances before the parliamentary select committees in the UK, 
central bankers convey this acquiescence to parliamentarians in their nonverbal facial expressions. 
Conversely, the quote by the Commons’ committee chair, Andrew Tyrie, characterizes a particular 
fiscal policy hearing as having “pretty vigorous exchanges” where “the Government was forced to 
explain its actions.” The description suggests a heated (threatening) tone in the room and a 
competition for control over policy decisions or outcomes. This, too, fits well with the documentation 
of anger expressed by parliamentarians and the chancellor over fiscal policy, although it may not have 
anticipated the clear finding of contempt by the chancellor towards the committee members. In short, 
the findings in this paper accord with the observations of those intimately involved in select 
committee hearings. 
Moreover, this paper builds upon a previous analysis of the deliberative content of the 
hearings, which used automated textual analysis software. The verbal content of these hearings found 
that in fiscal policy hearings, committee members would focus on a certain array of thematic concerns 
while the witness (namely the chancellor) would seek to address his own topic(s). As a process, 
questioners and witness would effectively talk past one another. The content of fiscal policy hearings 
is also far more partisan in orientation than either monetary policy or financial stability. From the 
present study of the nonverbal communication in these hearings, certain findings complement our 
understanding of the verbal content: angry/threatening expressions by parliamentarians (shared by the 
witness) together with the contempt of the witness run parallel to the partisan clashes and failure of 
both questioners and witness to establish a shared discourse around common themes (i.e., there is 
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more talking past one another than talking with one another—in other words, the witness tends to 
avoid answering the question asked, and instead provides a response which is unrelated or 
diversionary in nature). This nonverbal behaviour of each side may reflect latent emotions of anger 
and contempt by both backbench and frontbench parliamentarians. Yet bearing in mind that these 
hearings are not one-shot episodes but occur with regularity throughout the life of the parliamentary 
session, these expressions may also signal ongoing animosity and a continuous struggle for control 
over fiscal policy priorities by members of the legislature versus members of the executive. As such, 
committee members may be signalling their willingness to remain vigilant in questioning 
(“attacking”) the priorities and processes of the Treasury, while the chancellor is also signalling his 
resistance to this seeming challenge to his authority and competence. In this context, there appears to 
be little agreement as to who is situated where in the dominance hierarchy between the committee 
members and the Treasury. Confrontation between backbench and frontbench parliamentarians 
(legislature versus executive) persists—which is in accordance with behavioural/ethological 
principles—though the expectation that each set of actors will seek to maintain social order does not 
appear to apply. 
In the monetary policy hearings with Bank officials, the verbal content contains very little 
discernible partisanship, and for each theme in the hearings, both committee members and Bank 
official engage with each other—that is, Bank of England officials respond more directly to the 
questions of committee members, thereby creating a shared thematic discourse. The assessment of 
nonverbal behaviour in these hearings accords with this verbal content, in that these witnesses display 
more appeasement (“sad”) expressions towards both sets of committee members, suggesting that 
central bankers perceive these hearings as non-competitive encounters. From the behavioural ecology 
approach, this behaviour appears to signal a willingness to cooperate with (and defer to) Parliament.  
The comparison of nonverbal behaviour across the two chambers further complements the 
analysis of the verbal content. From the transcripts, it was found that in the Commons’ committee, 
MPs tended to divide their speaking time across several themes whereas in the Lords’ committee, 
each peer tended to focus on one theme (typically one that fell into that peer’s area of expertise). The 
finding of a higher incidence of reassuring facial expressions in the Lords’ committee is thus a feature 
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of a more relaxed, less confrontational discourse in this committee, where peers are also at liberty to 
engage witnesses in themes of greatest interest to them. 
Finally, this paper has neither sought nor obtained a precise quantification of nonverbal 
behaviour in committee hearings; rather, it has explored the relative occurrence of expressive displays 
and extent to which systematic differences are identifiable between types of witnesses and types of 
questioners in the real world setting of parliamentary oversight. Additionally—and 
unconventionally—this paper has made transparent a contrast between more inexperienced, young 
coders and a more experienced, older coder, with the former less able (or willing) to differentiate the 
genuine or phony natures of smile by Chancellor Osborne. Bearing in mind criticisms levelled against 
the over-reliance on undergraduates in empirical research, it is worth noting that phony smiles may be 
an aspect of nonverbal coding which requires far more extensive training and expertise to accurately 
code. Ultimately, however, the goal of this study is to gauge the extent to which the interactional 
dynamic of fiscal policy hearings differs from hearings with central bankers, and the extent to which 
contrasts are observed in nonverbal behaviour between parliamentary committees. To that end, this 
study has found clear differences. This study has not, however, directly gauged the effect of either 
verbal or nonverbal behaviour on the persuasiveness of the witnesses vis-à-vis committee members; 
this remains a task for further investigation, using both experimental methods and qualitative 






Figure 1: An Example of Nonverbal Communication in a Treasury Select Committee 
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Table 1: Summary Findings 
 
 
I. Mean Scores 
 
a. Total mean scores for facial, vocal and gestures: 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability 
b. Mean Facial scores: 
  All Committee members (Commons’ TSC + Lords’ EAC) 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability  
  Witness 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability  
c. Mean Gesture scores: 
  Witness 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability  
d. Mean Vocal scores: 
  Committee members 
   Lords Economic Affairs > Commons Treasury Select  
II. Facial Scores, by Emotion 
 
a. Facial Scores, by Emotion: ANGER 
All Committee members (Commons’ TSC + Lords’ EAC) 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability  
  Witness 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability  
b. Facial Scores, by Emotion: CONTEMPT 
Witness 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability  
 
 
Witness to Questioner 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > All Committee members (TSC + EAC) 
  
 c. Facial Scores, by Emotion: HAPPY 
Witness 
Lords Economic Affairs > Commons Treasury Select  
 
Witness 
(Treasury) Fiscal Policy > (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability  
 
 
e. Facial Scores, by Emotion: SAD 
 
Witness 
 (Bank of England) Monetary Policy & Financial Stability > (Treasury) Fiscal Policy  
 
Committee members 
 Commons Treasury Select > Lords Economic Affairs 
 
Witness 
 Commons Treasury Select > Lords Economic Affairs 
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J - Facial Scores
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MPs Peers Bank HMT
Figure 3a: Distributions of Facial Expression Scores – R only
APPENDIX 1A 
 
LIST OF 37 HEARINGS OVER 2010-15 PARLIAMENT  
(12 SELECTED FOR CODING IN ITALICS) 
 
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee 
Monetary Policy Hearings  
28 July 2010, Inflation Report  
10 November 2010, Inflation Report 
1 March 2011, Inflation Report  
28 June 2011, Inflation Report 
25 October 2011 [Quantitative Easing]    
28 November 2011, Inflation Report  
29 February 2012, Inflation Report  
26 June 2012, Inflation Report  
27 November 2012, Inflation Report  
25 June 2013, Inflation Report 
12 September 2013, Inflation Report  
26 November 2013, Inflation Report      
24 June 2014, Inflation Report   
10 September 2014, Inflation Report   
25 November 2014, Inflation Report 
24 February 2015, Inflation Report    
 
Fiscal Policy Hearings  
15 July 2010 [Budget]  
4 November 2010 [Spending Round]  
29 March 2011 [Budget]  
27 March 2012 [Budget] 
26 March 2013 [Budget]  
11 July 2013 [Spending Round]    
17 December 2014. Autumn Statement  
 
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee  
Monetary Policy 
16 November 2010: Meeting with the Governor  
27 March 2012: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Governor and MPC members) 
17 December 2013: Meeting with the Governor of the Bank of England  
10 March 2015: Meeting with the Governor of the Bank of England  
Fiscal Policy 
30 November 2010: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Chancellor and Treasury Staff) 
8 December 2011: Economic Outlook (Meeting with Chancellor and Treasury Staff) 
4 February 2014: Meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
  
Financial Stability Reports and Hearings 2011-2015 (All in TSC) 
17 January 2012:  (December 2011 FSR)  
17 July 2012: (June 2012 FSR)  
15 January 2013: (November 2012 FSR)  
2 July 2013: (June 2013 FSR)  
15 January 2014: (November 2013 FSR)  
15 July 2014: (June 2014 FSR) 
14 January 2015: (December 2014 FSR)  
  
APPENDIX 1B: PARTICIPANTS IN SELECTED HEARINGS 
 
MONETARY POLICY  
 
Treasury Select Committee, 28 July 2010 (Inflation Report)  
Members present: 
Chairman: Andrew Tyrie (Conservative)  
Michael Fallon (Conservative)  
Mark Garnier (Conservative)  
Andrea Leadsom (Conservative)  
Jesse Norman (Conservative) 
Brooks Newmark (Conservative)  
David Rutley (Conservative)  
David Ruffley (Conservative) 
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party)  
John Thurso (Liberal Democrat) 
Andy Love (Labour) 
John Mann (Labour) 
Pat McFadden (Labour) 
John Cryer (Labour) 
Chuka Umunna (Labour) 
Teresa Pearce (Labour) 
George Mudie (Labour) 
 
Witnesses 
Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England 
Mr Charlie Bean, Deputy Governor 
Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director, Markets 
Mr David Miles and Mr Andrew Sentance, External Members of the 
Monetary Policy Committee 
 
Treasury Select Committee, 25 October 2011 (Quantitative Easing)  
Members present: 
Chairman: Andrew Tyrie (Conservative)  
Michael Fallon (Conservative)  
Mark Garnier (Conservative)  
Andrea Leadsom (Conservative)  
Jesse Norman (Conservative) 
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party)  
John Thurso (Liberal Democrat) 
Andy Love (Labour) 
John Mann (Labour) 
David Ruffley (Conservative) 
George Mudie (Labour) 
 
Witnesses 
Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England 
Charles Bean, Deputy Governor Monetary Policy, Bank of England, 
gave evidence. 
 




Mr Andrew Tyrie MP (Conservative) (Chairman) 
Mark Garnier (Conservative) 
Andrea Leadsom MP (Conservative) 
Mr Andy Love MP (Labour) 
Rt Hon Pat McFadden MP (Labour) 
Mr George Mudie MP (Labour) 
Jesse Norman MP (Conservative) 
Mr Brooks Newmark (Conservative) 
David Ruffley MP, (Conservative) 




Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England 
Paul Fisher, Executive Director, Markets, Bank of England 
Dr Martin Weale CBE, External Member of the Monetary Policy 
Committee  
Dr Ben Broadbent, External Member of the Monetary Policy 
Committee, gave evidence. 
 
Treasury Select Committee: Bank of England May 2014 Inflation 
Report, Tuesday 24 June 2014 
Members present 
Andrew Tyrie (Conservative) (Chairman)  
Mark Garnier (Conservative)  
Steve Baker (Conservative)  
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party)  
Andy Love (Labour) 
John Mann (Labour) 
Mr Pat McFadden (Labour) 
Mr George Mudie (Labour) 
Mr Brooks Newmark (Conservative) 
Jesse Norman (Conservative) 
John Thurso (Liberal Democrat) 
David Ruffley (Conservative) 
Teresa Pearce (Labour)  
 
Witnesses 
Dr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England 
Sir Charles Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England 
Professor David Miles, Monetary Policy Committee Member 
Ian McCafferty, Monetary Policy Committee Member 
 
Treasury Select Committee: Bank of England, February 2015 
Inflation Report, 24 February 2015 
Witnesses 
Dr Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England  
Dr Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor, Monetary Policy Committee  
Professor David Miles, External Monetary Policy Committee member 
Dr Martin Weale, External Monetary Policy Committee member 
 
Members present 
Andrew Tyrie (Conservative) (Chairman)  
Rushanara Ali (Labour) 
Mark Garnier (Conservative)  
Steve Baker (Conservative)  
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party)  
Mike Kane (Labour) 
Andy Love (Labour) 
John Mann (Labour) 
Jesse Norman (Conservative) 
David Ruffley (Conservative) 
Alok Sharma (Conservative) 
John Thurso (Liberal Democrat) 
  
BUDGET HEARINGS  
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee: Budget: 15 July 2010 
Witnesses  
Rt. Hon George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Sir Nicholas Macpherson, Permanent Secretary 
Mr Mark Bowman, Director, Budget and Tax, HM Treasury 
 
Members present  
Mr Andrew Tyrie (Conservative) (Chair) 
Michael Fallon (Conservative) 
Mark Garnier (Conservative)  
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party)  
Andrew Love (Labour) 
Andrea Leadsom (Conservative) 
John Mann (Labour) 
Jesse Norman (Conservative) 
David Rutley (Conservative) 
John Thurso (Liberal Democrat) 
Mr Chuka Umunna (Labour)  
 
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee: Budget: 27 March 
2012 
Witnesses: 
Rt. Hon. George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Sir Nicholas Macpherson KCB, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 
James Bowler, Director, Strategy, Planning and Budget, HM Treasury 
 
Members present: 
Mr Andrew Tyrie (Conservative) (Chair) 
Michael Fallon (Conservative) 
Mark Garnier (Conservative)  
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party)  
Mr Andrew Love (Labour) 
John Mann (Labour) 
Mr Pat McFadden (Labour)  
Mr George Mudie (Labour)  
Teresa Pearce (Labour) 
Mr David Ruffley (Conservative) 
John Thurso (Liberal Democrat)  
 
House of Commons Treasury Select Committee: Autumn Statement, 
17 December 2014 
Witnesses:  
Rt. Hon. George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, HM 
Treasury  
James Bowler, Director, Strategy, Planning, and Budget, HM 
Treasury     
Members present: 
Mr Andrew Tyrie (Conservative) (Chair) 
Rushanara Ali (Labour)   
Steve Baker (Conservative) 
Mark Garnier (Conservative)  
Stewart Hosie (Scottish National Party)  
Mike Kane (Labour)   
Andrew Love (Labour) 
John Mann (Labour) 
Jesse Norman (Conservative) 
Alok Sharma (Conservative) 
Teresa Pearce (Labour) 
Mr David Ruffley (Conservative) 
John Thurso (Liberal Democrat)  
  
FINANCIAL STABILITY  
 
December 2011 FSR (Oral evidence, 17 January 2012) 
Members present 
Mr Andrew Tyrie MP (Conservative, Chichester) (Chairman)  
Michael Fallon MP (Conservative, Sevenoaks) 
Mark Garnier MP (Conservative, Wyre Forest) 
Stewart Hosie MP (Scottish National Party, Dundee East) 
Andrea Leadsom MP (Conservative, South Northamptonshire) 
Mr Andy Love MP (Labour, Edmonton) 
John Mann MP (Labour, Bassetlaw) 
Mr George Mudie MP (Labour, Leeds East) 
Mr Pat McFadden (Labour, Wolverhampton South East)  
Jesse Norman MP (Conservative, Hereford and South Herefordshire) 
Teresa Pearce MP (Labour, Erith and Thamesmead) 
David Ruffley MP, (Conservative, Bury St Edmunds) 




Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England  
Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability 
Michael Cohrs and Robert Jenkins, External members of the interim 
Financial Policy Committee, Bank of England 
 
December 2014 FSR (Oral evidence, 14 January 2015) 
Members present 
Mr Andrew Tyrie MP (Conservative, Chichester) (Chairman) 
Rushanara Ali MP (Labour, Bethnal Green & Bow) 
Steve Baker MP (Conservative, Wycombe) 
Mike Kane MP (Labour, Wythenshawe and Sale East)  
Mr Andy Love MP (Labour, Edmonton) 
Jesse Norman MP (Conservative, Hereford and South Herefordshire) 




Dr Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England 
Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, Bank of 
England 
Dame Clara Furse, External member, Financial Policy Committee 
Martin Taylor, External Policy Member, Financial Policy Committee 
 
  
 HOUSE OF LORDS ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE  
 
Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 8 December 2011 (Economic 
Outlook)  
 
Chairman: Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market (Conservative)    
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Conservative)  
Lord Lawson of Blaby (Conservative)  
Lord Levene of Portsoken (Crossbencher)  
Lord Lipsey (Labour)  
Lord Smith of Clifton (Liberal Democrat)  
Lord Tugendhat (Conservative)  
 
The Rt. Hon George Osborne MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Mark Bowman, Director for Strategy, Planning and Budget, Treasury  
 
Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 27 March 2012 (Economic 
Outlook)  
 
Chairman: Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market (Conservative)    
Lord Currie of Marylebone (Crossbencher)  
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Conservative)  
Lord Hollick (Labour)  
Lord Levene of Portsoken (Crossbencher)  
Baroness Kingsmill (Labour)  
 
Lord Lipsey (Labour)  
Lord Moonie (Labour) 
Lord Shipley (Liberal Democrat)  
Lord Smith of Clifton (Liberal Democrat)  
Lord Tugendhat (Crossbencher)  
 
Witnesses 
Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England 
Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director, Markets, Bank of England 




APPENDIX 2: Coding Scheme 
Questioner  Witness  Witness (2)  
Facial Number of 
Instances 
Facial Number of 
Instances 
Facial Number of 
Instances 
Fear  Fear  Fear  
Anger  Anger  Anger  
Disgust  Disgust  Disgust  
Contempt  Contempt  Contempt  
Happy  Happy  Happy  
Sad  Sad  Sad  
Surprise  Surprise  Surprise  
[Other expression]  [Other expression]  [Other expression]  
Eye Movement (wink, 
closed eyes) 
 Eye Movement (wink, 
closed eyes) 
 Eye Movement (wink, 
closed eyes) 
 








      
Vocal  Vocal  Vocal  
Volume Variation  Volume Variation  Volume Variation  
Accent (e.g., non-
British) 
 Accent (e.g., non-
British) 
 Accent (e.g., non-
British) 
 
Vocal Response (“uh 
huh”) 
 Vocal Response (“uh 
huh”) 
 Vocal Response (“uh 
huh”) 
 
Pauses  Pauses  Pauses  
Stress on Words  Stress on Words  Stress on Words  
Speed Variation  Speed Variation  Speed Variation  
Interruptions  Interruptions  Interruptions  
Summary Score-Vocal  Summary Score-Vocal  Summary Score-Vocal  
      
Gestures/Posture  Gestures/Posture  Gestures/Posture  
Head Movement (nod, 
shake) 
 Head Movement (nod, 
shake) 
 Head Movement (nod, 
shake) 
 
Hands (waving, open 
and extended in 
movement, etc) 
 Hands (waving, open 
and extended in 
movement, etc) 
 Hands (waving, open 
and extended in 
movement, etc) 
 
Posture (higher score 
for leaning forward, 
upright and alert) 
 Posture (higher score 
for leaning forward, 
upright and alert) 
 Posture (higher score 
for leaning forward, 











APPENDIX 3: Detailed Codes 
Table A1: Aggregate Scores (Counts) for Nonverbal Communication (Including Facial, Vocal and Gestures) 
Group Witness (Bank / Her Majesty’s Treasury, 
HMT) Mean Score 
 
 G J R 
All Bank of England 11.71 7.17 148.26 
All Financial Policy 
Committee 
8.62 7.18 172.53 
 
All Monetary Policy 
Committee 
12.74 7.17 140.16 
    


















 G J R G J R G J R G J R 
All Bank of 
England 









2.22 1.15 2.00 2.04 1.30 6.90 4.07 0.67 32.37 6.63 5.19 103.81 
             











































Table A3: Mean Scores for Nonverbal Communication: Facial Scores, by Emotion 
Group All Anger Scores: 
Committee  
 All Anger Scores: 
Witness  
 
 G J R G J R 
All Bank of 
England 




1.06 0.00 0.09 
 
 






0.83 0.08 0.4 0.50 0.00 0.41 


















 Table A3 continued: Mean Scores for Nonverbal Communication: Facial Scores, by Emotion 
Group All Contempt 
Scores: 
Committee  
 All Contempt 
Scores: Witness  
 All Happy Scores: Witness  
 G J R G J R G J R 
All Bank of 
England 





0.10 0.31 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.63 
 






0.22  0.75  0.03  
 
0.27 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.83 4.12 










































 Table A3 continued: Mean Scores for Nonverbal Communication: Facial Scores, by Emotion 
Group All Sad Scores: Committee   All Sad Scores: Witness   
 G J R G J R 






       












All Monetary Policy Committee 0.53 0.02 0.19 0.46 0.03 0.26 
       
All HMT 0.70 0.06 0.18 0.22 0.04 0.06 
       
All Lords Economic Affairs Committee 0.46 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.00 0.00 
All Treasury Select Committee 0.52 
[1.1x] 
0.02 
≈ tie 
0.47 
[9.4x] 
0.42 
[1.2x] 
0.03 
≈ tie 
0.26 
[26x] 
 
 
 
 
 
